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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This article compares the bases upon which actions are taken or decisions are made 
in relation to those considered to lack the material capacity in the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005 (‘MCA’) and the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 (‘AWI’). 
Through a study of (1) the statutory provisions; and (2) the case-law decided under 
the two statutes, it addresses the question of whether the use of the term ‘best 
interests’ in the MCA and its – deliberate – absence from the AWI makes a material 
difference when comparing the two Acts. This question is of considerable importance 
when examining the compatibility of these legislative regimes in the United Kingdom 
with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘CRPD’).  
 
The article is written by two practising lawyers, one a Scottish solicitor, and one an 
English barrister. Each has sought to cast a critical eye over the legislative 
framework on the other side of the border between their two jurisdictions as well as 
over the framework (and jurisprudence) in their own jurisdiction. Its comparative 
analysis is not one that has previously been attempted; it shows that both 
jurisdictions are on their own journeys, although not ones with quite the direction that 
might be anticipated from a plain reading of the respective statutes.  
 
The article is divided as follows: 
 
Part 1 considers the meaning and significance of ‘best interests’ in the General Comment No 1 
(2014) issued by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘the Committee’) 
entitled ‘Article 12: Equal Recognition before the Law’ (‘the General Comment’);1  
 
Part 2 compares the statutory provisions; 
 
Part 3 examines the MCA in more detail, and the cases decided thereunder;  
Part 4 examines the AWI in more detail, and the cases decided thereunder;  
 
Part 5 offers some observations upon the results of the analysis in Parts 1-4.  
 
 
* Alex Ruck Keene is an English Barrister, 39 Essex Chambers, Honorary Research Lecturer 
University of Manchester, UK and Visiting Research Fellow at the Dickson Poon School of Law, Kings 
College London, UK Adrian D Ward is a Scottish solicitor and consultant to TC Young LLP, Glasgow 
and Edinburgh. This article was largely generated by their work together (and lively discussions!) as 
members of the core research group for the Essex Autonomy Three Jurisdictions Project. That project 
reviewed the three UK jurisdictions for compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, and made recommendations. Its final report is available at 
http://autonomy.essex.ac.uk/eap-three-jurisdictions-report. This article was submitted for publication 
on 30 October 2015 and accordingly does not take account of developments since that date. 
1  Available online at: 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRPD/C/GC/1&Lan
g=en 
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II. PART 1: THE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ‘BEST INTERESTS’ 
 
By ratifying CRPD and its Optional Protocol, the UK committed itself to be bound by 
CRPD. ‘Best interests’ does not appear in CRPD, nor do two terms relevant to the 
discussion in this paper, namely ‘substitute decision-making’ and ‘supported 
decision-making.’ However, the terms appear in the General Comment, an 
interpretation of Article 12 of CRPD offered by the UN Committee. The interpretation 
of CRPD by the UN Committee is not binding on the UK. That interpretation should 
nevertheless receive careful consideration in assessing compliance of the UK 
jurisdictions with CRPD. 
 
Article 12 reaffirms that persons with disabilities have the right to recognition 
everywhere as persons before the law (Article 12.1). It requires States Parties to 
recognise that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with 
others in all aspects of life (Article 12.2); to take appropriate measures to provide 
access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their 
legal capacity (Article 12.3); and to ensure that ‘all measures that relate to the 
exercise of legal capacity provide for appropriate and effective safeguards to prevent 
abuse in accordance with international human rights law’ (Article 12.4, which 
proceeds to specify safeguards, including that such measures ‘respect the rights, will 
and preferences of the person’). Article 12.5 requires States Parties to take all 
appropriate and effective measures to ensure the equal right of persons with 
disabilities in specified property and financial matters.  
 
Article 12 uses ‘capacity’ in the broadest sense, to encompass all aspects of legal 
status and legal personality of an adult. ‘Capacity’ in MCA and ‘incapacity’ in AWI are 
used with the different meaning of factual capability. In AWI, ‘incapacity’ is explicitly 
derived from the definition of ‘incapable’. 
 
Paragraph 7 of the General Comment urges that ‘substitute decision-making 
regimes’ be abolished. According to paragraph 26, such regimes should be replaced 
with ‘supported decision-making, which respects the person’s autonomy, will and 
preferences’. At first sight, it would appear that this could only be applicable to 
people factually capable of making valid decisions, if – when such be needed – they 
are provided with sufficient support. That the contrast between substitute decision-
making and supported decision-making is not so limited is clear from paragraph 21 
of the General Comment, which reads:  
 
Where, after significant efforts have been made, it is not practicable to determine the will and 
preferences of an individual, the ‘best interpretation of will and preferences’ must replace the 
‘best interests’ determinations. This respects the rights, will and preferences of the individual, in 
accordance with article 12, paragraph 4. The ‘best interests’ principle is not a safeguard which 
complies with article 12 in relation to adults. The ‘will and preferences’ paradigm must replace 
the ‘best interests’ paradigm to ensure that persons with disabilities enjoy the right to legal 
capacity on an equal basis with others. 
 
A ‘best interpretation’ approach is thus contrasted with a ‘best interests’ approach. 
Where an individual is factually incapable of validly acting or deciding, the core issue 
in relation to CRPD as interpreted in the General Comment is not that someone 
other than the individual will be required to consider the basis upon which to take an 
action or make a decision. The issue is whether the basis is a ‘best interpretation’ 
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approach within a ‘supported decision-making’ regime, or a ‘best interests’ approach 
in a ‘substitute decision-making’ regime. 
 
The General Comment describes characteristics of supported decision-making 
regimes at length, particularly in paragraph 29, but does not provide clear guidance 
in situations of factual incapability to act or decide in the matter in question beyond 
that given in paragraph 21 (quoted above). A definition of substitute decision-making 
regimes is however offered in paragraph 27, as follows: 
 
27. Substitute decision-making regimes can take many different forms, including plenary 
guardianship, judicial interdiction and partial guardianship. However, these regimes have 
certain common characteristics: they can be defined as systems where (i) legal capacity is 
removed from a person, even if this is in respect of a single decision; (ii) a substitute decision-
maker can be appointed by someone other than the person concerned, and this can be done 
against his or her will; [and/or]2 (iii) any decision made by a substitute decision-maker is based 
on what is believed to be in the objective ‘best interests’ of the person concerned, as opposed 
to being based on the person’s own will and preferences. 
 
If the conjunctive version of the definition is adopted then if, in terms of element (iii), 
the basis of deciding in situations of factual incapability is the ‘best interpretation’ 
approach rather than the ‘best interests’ approach, the regime is not a substitute 
decision-making regime.  
 
If the partially disjunctive definition is adopted, then if the basis of decision-making is 
‘best interests’, the regime is a substitute decision-making regime; if not, the 
characterisation of the regime as substitute or supported decision-making depends 
upon whether the other elements apply.  
 
For purposes of this article, we proceed therefore on the basis that the true test for 
compatibility is not whether a decision-maker is appointed, but whether the 
appointed decision-maker takes their decisions on a ‘best interests’ rather than a 
‘best interpretation’ basis (as these terms are used in the General Comment).  
 
III. PART 2: THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS COMPARED 
 
In this section, we compare and where relevant contrast the key features of the MCA 
and the AWI simply by reference to the statutory provisions, rather than delving into 
(1) why each regime looks the way it does (beyond a brief introductory comparison); 
or (2) how the courts have been applying the regimes in practice; or (3) how others 
2 The English-language version of the General Comment dated 19th May 2014 and issued following 
the 11th session of the UN Committee 31st March – 11th April 2014, and the official versions in other 
languages, all appear to have ‘and’ or its equivalents, so that the three elements of the definition are 
conjunctive. However, in at least one subsequent English-language iteration, ‘and’ has been altered to 
‘or’, so that the elements are disjunctive.2 More recently, it has been suggested informally to the 
authors that the intention of the UN Committee is that element (i) should be followed by ‘and’ and that 
elements (ii) and (iii) should be alternatives, with ‘or’ between them. If the intention is that all three 
elements are to be taken separately, then the authors’ view is that the English regime would fail, but 
there may be more arguments to be had as to the Scottish regime. They are not addressed in this 
paper. 
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with significant roles have been applying the regimes in practice. We do not assume 
any necessary familiarity with the relevant regimes.3 
 
Both Acts are predicated upon principles, but even at this stage the drafting 
differences between them are substantial. They require to be understood, from each 
side of the geographical border between the two jurisdictions, in order to address the 
comparisons which form the objective of this article.  
 
The differences in structure and content are significant from the outset, upon 
comparison of s 1 (‘the principles’) of the MCA and s 1 (‘general principles and 
fundamental definitions’) of the AWI, notwithstanding the similarities in titles. We 
return in Part 5 to individual observations as to whether, especially as applied in 
practice, the differences between the two statutes are as great as (or greater than) 
they are painted in this Part. They are not the result of any deliberate differentiation. 
We state the MCA position first, in part because it contains the phrase ‘best interests’ 
that is such a lightning rod in the context of the CRPD. We could equally have begun 
with AWI: indeed, AWI as enacted had already reached substantially its final form in 
1995,4 whereas the MCA was introduced into the Westminster Parliament in 2003). 
The two Acts evolved from broadly parallel law reform processes, conducted with 
awareness of each other but not unduly influenced by the other, rendering the 
question ‘why are they different?’ irrelevant for the purposes of this paper, and 
probably more a matter for sociological, rather than legal or political, analysis. 
 
A. The Structures of the Acts 
 
The MCA is predicated upon acts being done or decisions being made on behalf of 
an individual5 lacking capacity in relation to a matter (see MCA s 1(5), s 4 and s 5). 
The AWI, by contrast, is predicated upon interventions in the affairs of adults (see 
AWI s 1), and includes provision for measures applicable in circumstances where 
such adults are incapable of taking an action or in relation to a material decision (see 
e.g. AWI s 53(1) in relation to intervention orders and AWI s 58(1)(a) in relation to 
guardianship orders).  
 
In both instances, subject only to an exception in relation to the AWI discussed 
below, the individual in question will be factually incapable of validly acting or 
deciding in the relevant matter, and a person or persons other than that individual 
will be required to consider the basis upon which to take an action or make a 
decision. Both statutes therefore set down how such actions or decisions are to be 
taken (including, in both cases, not doing something for or on behalf of the 
individual).  
 
 
 
3 A useful introduction focused primarily upon England and Wales, but also including an overview of 
the position in Scotland can be found in Gordon Ashton (ed), Mental Capacity Law and Practice (3rd 
edition, Jordans 2015).  
4 See the draft Bill appended to the 1995 SLC Report referred to in Part 4 below. 
5 The MCA applies to those aged 16 and above (with certain limited exceptions and certain limited 
provisions of application to those below the age of 16). The same also applies to the AWI. 
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B. The Principles and their Accompanying Definitions  
 
MCA s 1 commences with three ‘screening’ principles, containing a presumption of 
capacity (MCA, s 1(2)), a requirement to provide all practicable assistance before a 
person is treated as incapable (MCA s 1(3)), and a declaration that a person must 
not be treated as incapable ‘merely because he makes an unwise decision’ (MCA s 
1(4)). 
 
C. AWI Contains No Equivalent ‘Screening’ Principles  
 
MCA s 2 defines when ‘a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter’. As noted 
below, that definition is carried back to MCA s 1(5) (which provides the basis for 
determining what decisions or actions can be taken on behalf of the individual 
lacking capacity).  
 
The equivalent definition in the AWI is the definition of ‘incapable’ in AWI s 1(6), 
which, in contrast to the MCA, is not carried back to the principles in AWI s 1(1) – 
(5), discussed below. The AWI principles simply apply to ‘an adult’. They can thus 
apply to an adult whose relevant capacity is not impaired, if something done under or 
in pursuance of AWI results in an intervention in the affairs of that adult. Ward 
developed this point further in his article ‘Two ‘adults’ in one incapacity case? – 
thoughts for Scotland from an English deprivation of liberty decision’, 6 when he 
hypothesised what might have been the treatment under the AWI if the facts 
addressed in A Local Authority v WMA and MA7 had arisen before a Scottish court. 
 
As regards the basis for acting or deciding on behalf of a person lacking the material 
decision-making capacity, the MCA then states, and in this regard is predicated 
upon, two overarching principles:  
 
a. An action done or a decision made under the act for or on behalf of a person who lacks 
capacity must be done, or made, in his best interests (MCA s 1(5));  
 
b. Before the act is done, or the decision is made, regard must be had to whether the purpose 
for which it is needed can be as effectively achieved in a way that is less restrictive of the 
person’s rights and freedom of action (MCA s 1(6)). It should perhaps be noted that that 
requires consideration of whether there is a need for any action or decision at all. 
 
Two characteristics of the above are notable. Firstly, the two principles quoted 
immediately above apply only to ‘a person who lacks capacity’. Secondly, MCA s 
1(5) places major focus upon the concept of ‘best interests’. MCA s 1(5) is fleshed 
out by MCA s 4, which identifies the steps to be taken in determining what is in the 
best interests of the person. The extent to which there is a hierarchy in MCA s 4 as 
regards these steps is discussed in some detail in Part 3. 
 
The Scottish principles, which stand in place of MCA s 1(5), as fleshed out by MCA s 
4, and MCA s 1(6), are as follows: 
 
 
6 [2013] SLT (News) 239-242 
7 [2013] EWHC 2580 (COP) 
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1. –  
(1) The principles set out in subss (2) and (4) shall be given effect to in relation to any 
intervention in the affairs of an adult under or in pursuance of this Act, including any order 
made in or for the purpose of any proceedings under this Act for or in connection with an 
adult.  
(2) There shall be no intervention in the affairs of an adult unless the person responsible for 
authorising or effecting the intervention is satisfied that the intervention will benefit the adult 
and that such benefit cannot reasonably be achieved without the intervention.  
(3) Where it is determined that an intervention as mentioned in subs (1) is to be made, such 
intervention shall be the least restrictive option in relation to the freedom of the adult, 
consistent with the purpose of the intervention.  
(4) In determining if an intervention is to be made and, if so, what intervention is to be made, 
account shall be taken of –  
(a)  the present and past wishes and feelings of the adult so far as they can be 
ascertained by any means of communication, whether human or by mechanical aid 
(whether of an interpretative nature or otherwise) appropriate to the adult;  
(b)  the views of the nearest relative, named person and the primary carer of the adult, 
in so far as it is reasonable and practicable to do so; 
(c)  the views of –  
(i)  any guardian, continuing attorney or welfare attorney of the adult who has 
powers relating to the proposed intervention; and 
(ii)  any person whom the sheriff has directed to be consulted, 
in so far as it is reasonable and practicable to do so; and 
 (d)  the views of any other person appearing to the person responsible for authorising or 
effecting the intervention to have an interest in the welfare of the adult or in the 
proposed intervention, where these views have been made known to the person 
responsible, in so far as it is reasonable and practicable to do so. 
(5) Any guardian, continuing attorney, welfare attorney or manager of an establishment 
exercising functions under this Act or under any order of the sheriff in relation to an adult 
shall, in so far as it is reasonable and practicable to do so, encourage the adult to exercise 
whatever skills he has concerning his property, financial affairs or personal welfare, as the 
case may be, and to develop new such skills. 
 
AWI s 1(3) is broadly equivalent to MCA s 1(6). There are echoes of some of the 
other AWI principles in the supplementary provisions of MCA s 4. However, a ‘best 
interests’ test was explicitly rejected for the purposes of the AWI. Instead of focusing 
the basis for acting and deciding on behalf of a person/adult upon the single concept 
of ‘best interests’, the AWI provides a set of general principles none of which is 
stated to take precedence or priority over any other: see the relevant passage from 
Scottish Law Commission Report No 151 on Incapable Adults quoted below. Thus, 
where the MCA has MCA s 1(5) – the ‘best interests’ test – and subsidiary principles 
in MCA s 4 relevant to determining what is in a person’s best interests, the AWI has 
AWI s 1(1), (2), (4) and (5), none of them occupying a dominant position (except as 
noted below), with AWI s 1(3) ranking equally with them. The AWI accordingly has 
no principles serving the subsidiary purpose of guiding how to determine the 
application of any one dominant principle, except to the limited extent noted in the 
next paragraph. 
 
AWI s 3(5A) was added to the AWI by the Adult Support and Protection (Scotland) 
Act 2007 (ASP). It provides a principle which is subsidiary to AWI s 1(4)(a), for the 
purpose of assisting the ascertainment of the adult’s wishes and feelings for the 
purpose of sheriff court proceedings, by requiring the sheriff to take account of them 
as expressed by an independent advocate (as defined). 
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There is an inequality among the various principles in AWI s 1(4) to the extent that 
the obligation to take account of the adult’s wishes and feelings, if ascertainable, is 
absolute. That is emphasised by the inclusion of ‘by any means of communication’ 
and by the exclusion of the qualification, which appears in the other paragraphs of 
AWI s 1(4): ‘insofar as it is reasonable and practicable to do so’. 
 
It should be reiterated that the principles set out in AWI s 1(1) – (5) can, in principle, 
apply equally to an adult whose relevant capacity is not impaired, if something done 
under or in pursuance of the AWI results in an intervention in the affairs of that adult. 
To that extent they could be said to be non-discriminatory on grounds of disability. 
 
D. The Judiciaries 
 
It is relevant to the following discussion that since the inception of the MCA England 
& Wales have had the advantage of a specialist court, the Court of Protection, 
exercising jurisdiction under the MCA. In Scotland, the 1995 SLC Report on 
Incapable Adults No 151 recommended that jurisdiction under what became the AWI 
be entrusted to specialist sheriffs, and provisions to that effect were included in the 
draft Bill annexed to the Report, but that recommendation was not implemented, and 
still has not yet been implemented.8 
 
E. Vulnerable Adults 
 
We note in passing that another significant difference between England & Wales, 
and Scotland, is that in England & Wales any necessary protection of adults who are 
vulnerable9 and at risk, but not necessarily incapable, is dealt with by the High Court 
under the inherent jurisdiction; whereas in Scotland such situations are addressed 
under the statutory provisions of the ASP. The remedies available under the ASP are 
prescribed in that Act, and appear to be more restricted than those under the 
inherent jurisdiction. 
 
IV. THE MCA10 
 
A. Background  
 
The MCA was the result of many years of dedicated reform effort, commencing with 
a Law Commission Consultation Paper in 1991. While the need to have a 
8 Under the provisions of the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 the Lord President (the head of the 
judiciary in Scotland) may designate specialist categories of sheriff to whom sheriffs principal would 
allocate specific sheriffs; and procedure to create all-Scotland specialisms to which all-Scotland 
sheriffs would be appointed. At time of writing any decision to implement these provisions in relation 
to the AWI jurisdiction awaits appointment of a new Lord President, following the retiral of Lord Gill 
(the principal architect of these and other reforms). 
9 This term is not now used in relation to safeguarding in England following the passage of the Care 
Act 2014, but retains meaning, not least in relation to the exercise by the High Court of its inherent 
jurisdiction: see L (Vulnerable Adults with Capacity: Court's Jurisdiction), In re (No 2) [2012] EWCA 
Civ 253; [2013] Fam 1.  
10 This section draws (with permission) upon an article written by Ruck Keene and Cressida Auckland 
entitled ‘More presumptions please: wishes, feelings and best interests decision-making’ [2015] Elder 
Law Journal 231.  
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mechanism in place to make decisions on behalf of those lacking the cognitive 
capabilities to do so was not seriously under debate, the basis on which such 
decisions were to be made was less clear. Drawing on the frameworks in place in 
other jurisdictions and under the pre-existing common law, two alternative 
mechanisms were suggested to facilitate the making of these decisions. Substituted 
judgment, which attempted to reach the decision which the person would themselves 
have made if they had capacity, was contrasted with an approach predicated upon 
an objective assessment of what was in the person’s ‘best interests’. While the ‘best 
interests’ assessment had dominated healthcare decisions since the decision of Re 
F (An Adult: Sterilisation),11 it may be noted that in at least one domain – statutory 
wills – the status quo prior to the MCA was one of substituted judgment, whereby the 
judge was required to consider the ‘antipathies’ and ‘affections’ of the particular 
person concerned.12  
 
After much consultation, it was the objective mechanism that found favour with the 
Law Commission, who highlighted the difficulties posed by substituted judgment 
when making decisions for those who have never had capacity,13 as well as the 
effect it had of giving a lower priority to the person’s present emotions than those 
anticipated in the person had they had unimpaired capacities. 14  The Law 
Commission did, however, consider that ‘the two tests need not be mutually 
exclusive’, instead pushing for a compromise ‘whereby a best interests test is 
modified by a requirement that the substitute decision-maker first goes through an 
exercise in substituted judgment’.15 
 
The result of this long drafting process was (for these purposes) ss 1(5) and 4 MCA 
2005 which provide – in combination – the requirement that decisions should be 
made in the person’s ‘best interests’, taking into account a number of relevant 
factors. Crucially, under s 4(6), the decision-maker must, ‘so far as is reasonably 
ascertainable’, consider:  
 
(a) the person’s past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any relevant written 
statement made by her when she had capacity),  
(b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence her decision if she had capacity, and  
(c) the other factors that she would be likely to consider if she were able to do so.  
 
However, s 4(6) is only one of the list of factors in the ‘checklist’. In addition, the 
decision cannot be made merely on the basis of the age or appearance of the 
person lacking capacity;16 the likelihood of the person regaining capacity must be 
considered; 17  and the individual must, as far as is reasonably practicable, be 
permitted and encouraged to participate in the decision.18 The decision-maker must 
never be motivated by a desire to bring about death,19 and must take account ‘if it is 
11 [1990] 2 AC 1 
12 Re D(J) [1982] Ch 237 
13 Law Commission, Mental Incapacity (Law Com No 231,1995) para 3. 25 
14 Ibid., 3.29 
15 Law Commission, Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: A New Jurisdiction (Law 
Com No 128,1993) para 2.4 
16 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 4(2) 
17 Ibid s 4(3) 
18 Ibid s 4(4) 
19 Ibid s 4(5) 
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practicable and appropriate to consult them’, of the views of others engaged in the 
care of the person, or interested in their welfare.20  
 
On the face of the statute, no one of these factors is to take priority. Indeed, the 
Report of the Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Incapacity Bill21 was clear that this 
was deliberate: determining the best interests of the individual ‘required flexibility’ 
and was said to be best achieved by ‘enabling the decision-maker to take account of 
a variety of circumstances, views and attitudes which may have a bearing on the 
decision in question.’ It was for this reason that they did not recommend any 
weighting or giving priority to the factors involved in determining best interests. In a 
similar vein, as the Government identified, there was a deliberate policy decision that 
‘a prioritisation of the factors would unnecessarily fetter their operation in the many 
and varied circumstances in which they might fall to be applied’.22 
 
This approach was carried through into the Code of Practice accompanying the 
MCA. While the individual’s wishes and feelings, beliefs and values ‘should be taken 
fully into account’, they will ‘not necessarily be the deciding factor’.23  
 
B. The MCA in Practice  
 
Given the decision not to prioritise any of the factors in s 4, it is of little surprise that 
the case law on the relative weight that should be ascribed to a person’s wishes and 
feelings superficially lacks coherence.  
 
It is possible to suggest, however, that a dialogue can be seen emerging in the case-
law between two lines of thought: on the one hand that a rebuttable presumption 
exists in favour of giving effect to a person’s wishes and feelings; and on the other 
that the individual’s wishes and feelings represent just one factor in the balance 
sheet which should not receive special consideration.  
 
This dialogue found its roots in Re S and S (Protected Persons)24 where talk of 
‘presumptions’ first emerged. HHJ Marshall QC forcefully remarked:  
 
… where P can and does express a wish or view which is not irrational (in the sense of being a 
wish which a person with full capacity might reasonably have), is not impracticable as far as its 
physical implementation is concerned, and is not irresponsible having regard to the extent of 
P's resources (ie whether a responsible person of full capacity who had such resources might 
reasonably consider it worth using the necessary resources to implement his wish) then that 
situation carries great weight, and effectively gives rise to a presumption in favour of 
implementing those wishes, unless there is some potential sufficiently detrimental effect for P of 
doing so which outweighs this.25 
 
It would, in HHJ Marshall’s view, take significant detriment to P to be sufficient to 
outweigh the ‘sense of impotence’ and ‘frustration’ of having one’s wishes 
20 Ibid s 4(7) 
21 (HL 2002-03, 189-I, HC 1083-I) 
22 Government Response to the Scrutiny Committee’s Report on the Draft Mental Incapacity Bill 
(CMD 6121, February 2004) 
23 Para 5.38 
24 C v V [2009] WTLR 315, [2008] COPLR Con Vol 1074 
25 Ibid [57] 
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overruled.26 
 
What, after all, is the point of taking great trouble to ascertain or deduce P's views, and to 
encourage P to be involved in the decision making process, unless the objective is to try to 
achieve the outcome which P wants or prefers, even if he does not have the capacity to 
achieve it for himself?27 
 
The approach espoused by HHJ Marshall was, however, short-lived. No sooner had 
the judgment been handed down in Re S and S, than Lewison J responded in Re 
P28 that HHJ Marshall ‘may have slightly overstated the importance to be given to 
P’s wishes’.29 Lewison’s approach found favour with Munby J in Re M,30 the latter 
specifically endorsing the ‘compelling force’ of the judgment. Relying on the drafting 
of the Act, Munby J was clear that: ‘[t]he statute lays down no hierarchy as between 
the various factors which have to be borne in mind’,31 and while ‘P's wishes and 
feelings will always be a significant factor to which the court must pay close regard’, 
‘the weight to be attached to P's wishes and feelings will always be case-specific and 
fact-specific.’32 Munby J indicated that the important considerations in determining 
the weight to be ascribed to the wishes and feelings of the individual were:  
 
a) the degree of P’s incapacity, for the nearer to the borderline the more weight must in 
principle be attached to P’s wishes and feelings… 
b) the strength and consistency of the views being expressed by P;  
c) the possible impact on P of knowledge that her wishes and feelings are not being given 
effect to;  
d) the extent to which P’s wishes and feelings are, or are not, rational, sensible, responsible 
and pragmatically capable of sensible implementation in the particular circumstances; and  
e) crucially, the extent to which P’s wishes and feelings, if given effect to, can properly be 
accommodated within the court’s overall assessment of what is in her best interests.33 
 
The case-law that follows could largely be characterised as a dialogue between 
these two competing views,34 but against this backdrop, the MCA first came before 
the Supreme Court in Aintree University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v James,35 
in which Lady Hale emphasised that the purpose of the best interests test was, in the 
view of Lady Hale, ‘to consider matters from the patient’s point of view’: 
 
Insofar as it is possible to ascertain the patient’s wishes and feelings, his beliefs and values or 
the things which were important to him, it is those which should be taken into account because 
they are a component in making the choice which is right for him as an individual human 
being.36 
 
In placing the emphasis on the patient’s own views, and by stressing the importance 
of considering decisions from the perspective of the individual concerned, the 
Supreme Court confirmed the place of the individual at the centre of the assessment, 
26 Ibid [58] 
27 Ibid [55] 
28 [2009] EWHC 163 (Ch), [2009] COPLR Con Vol 906 
29 Ibid [41]  
30 Re M (Statutory Will) [2011] 1 WLR 344; ITW v Z and others [2009] EWHC 2525 (Fam) 
31 Ibid [32]  
32 Ibid  
33 Ibid [35] 
34 Discussed at greater length in the article cited above n 7. 
35 [2013] 3 WLR 1299, [2013] COPLR 492 
36 Ibid [45]  
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recognising the subjectivity that any assessment of an individual’s best interests 
must inevitably entail. It is perhaps not entirely surprising that the sole judgment was 
given by Lady Hale, who (in a previous existence as Brenda Hoggett) had played a 
key role in the Law Commission’s work identified above, in which a compromise had 
been attempted between substituted judgment and objective best interests 
assessment.  
 
Case law decided subsequent to the decision in Aintree has (with some 
exceptions 37 ) increasingly followed a model of placing greater emphasis upon 
identifying the wishes and feelings of the individuals concerned (in particular those 
wishes identified prior to the loss of capacity). Further, these wishes are taking on a 
much higher priority in the assessment of ‘best interests’; and clear and convincing 
justification is required before they are departed from.  
 
Nowhere is this perhaps more evident than the decision of Peter Jackson J in Wye 
Valley NHS Trust v B,38 concerned with medical treatment urgently required to save 
the life of an elderly man with long-standing mental health difficulties who was said 
not to have the capacity to consent to or refuse the treatment but was profoundly 
opposed to the proposed procedure. The treating Trust submitted that the views 
expressed by a person lacking capacity were in principle entitled to less weight than 
those of a person with capacity. Peter Jackson J accepted that this was true ‘only to 
the limited extent that the views of a capacitous person are by definition decisive in 
relation to any treatment that is being offered to him so that the question of best 
interests does not arise.’39  
 
Importantly, however, he went on:  
 
once incapacity is established so that a best interests decision must be made, there is no 
theoretical limit to the weight or lack of weight that should be given to the person’s wishes and 
feelings, beliefs and values. In some cases, the conclusion will be that little weight or no weight 
can be given; in others, very significant weight will be due.40 
 
Rightly, Peter Jackson J emphasised: 
 
…[t]his is not an academic issue, but a necessary protection for the rights of people with 
disabilities. As the [MCA] and the European Convention make clear, a conclusion that a person 
lacks decision-making capacity is not an ‘off-switch’ for his rights and freedoms. To state the 
obvious, the wishes and feelings, beliefs and values of people with a mental disability are as 
important to them as they are to anyone else, and may even be more important. It would 
therefore be wrong in principle to apply any automatic discount to their point of view.41  
 
Not least because he made a determined effort to understand Mr B’s perspective – 
including by spending time with him at his hospital bed-side – Peter Jackson J found 
himself able to hold that he was quite sure that it was not in Mr B’s best interests to 
 
37 The most glaring being that of the Court of Appeal in RB v Brighton and Hove City Council [2014] 
EWCA Civ 561, [2014] COPLR 629, a decision under appeal to the European Court of Human Rights 
at the time of writing.  
38 [2015] EWCOP 60, [2015] COPLR 843 
39 Ibid [10] 
40 Ibid [10] 
41 Ibid [11] 
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…take away his little remaining independence and dignity in order to replace it with a future for 
which he understandably has no appetite and which could only be achieved after a traumatic 
and uncertain struggle that he and no one else would have to endure. There is a difference 
between fighting on someone’s behalf and just fighting them. Enforcing treatment in this case 
would surely be the latter.42 
 
V. THE AWI 
 
A. Background  
 
The direction of development of Scots law over the two decades preceding 
enactment of AWI was significantly towards what in the language of the General 
Comment would be characterised as a regime of best interpretation of will and 
preferences, rejecting a best interests approach. Disappointingly, since then that 
trend has halted, and to an extent has been reversed. 
 
In personal welfare matters Scotland had, from 1913 to 1984, enshrined in statute 
precisely the form of guardianship which is described in paragraph 27 of the General 
Comment as a ‘substitute decision-making regime’, and which – according to 
paragraph 7 of the General Comment - should be abolished. That form of 
guardianship was introduced by the Mental Deficiency and Lunacy (Scotland) Act 
1913 and continued in subsequent legislation. Guardians had the same powers as 
parents of a young child, regardless of the actual capabilities of each adult to whom 
such guardians were appointed. The route towards the AWI could be seen as 
starting with the progressive realisation of the inappropriateness of subjecting adults 
to such guardianship, so that the numbers in such guardianship dwindled from 2,440 
in 1960 to around 300 by 1982, the year in which the Scottish Home and Health 
Department and the Scottish Education Department, Social Work Services Group, 
issued its Review of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1960, proposing radical 
reform. Three decades before the General Comment, Scotland implemented that key 
recommendation by abolishing such guardianship.43 Abolition inevitably created a 
vacuum in safeguarding and promoting the rights of persons/adults. That vacuum 
was filled principally by re-introduction, in modernised form, by courts operating in 
the civil law tradition, of the former Roman law concept of appointment of tutors-
dative to adults, the first such case being Morris, Petitioner,44 which Ward described 
in Revival of Tutors-Dative.45 Modernisation from and including Morris took the form 
of limited powers tailored to need, an emphasis upon provision of support, and time-
limiting to ensure review. Subsequent developments included, in appropriate cases, 
provisions anticipatory of what is now termed supported decision-making such as 
cases where, in particular matters, tutors were authorised to identify and present 
viable alternatives from which the adult could make a choice. 
 
If the views of the UN Committee are applied retrospectively to the revival and 
development of tutors-dative in Scots law over the period from Morris in 1986 to Part 
6 of AWI coming into force in 2002, it is reasonable to characterise the tutory regime 
42 Ibid [45] 
43 In terms of the Mental Health (Scotland) (Amendment) Act 1983 as consolidated into the Mental 
Health (Scotland) Act 1984. 
44 Unreported, 1986 
45 [1987] SLT (News) 69 
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as being at least well on the road towards a supported decision-making regime 
based on best interpretation. This is rather than a substitute decision-making regime 
based on best interests. It also demonstrates a trend towards the former in contrast 
to the trend towards the latter in decisions under AWI as identified below. 
 
In the area of property and affairs, however, Scots law remained substantially 
unreformed. The standard technique for managing the property and affairs of adults 
deemed to be incapable was appointment of curators bonis: a regime which, until it 
was abolished with effect from 1st April 2002 by implementation of relevant 
provisions of the AWI, graphically demonstrated the injustices resulting from the lack 
of safeguards such as those required under Article 12.4 of CRPD. This was a regime 
undoubtedly within the definition of unacceptable substitute decision-making as 
described in the General Comment, already perceived as ripe for abolition long 
before CRPD. Unacceptable aspects of that regime, and their consequences, were 
described at some length in The Power to Act (SSMH).46 Some inroads were made 
by the reintroduction of the former Roman law tutor-at-law, the first such case being 
Britton v Britton’s Curator Bonis. 47  As operated in practice, these appointments 
addressed the lack of respect for the will and preference of persons/adults in the 
otherwise unreformed area of property and financial decision-making. 
 
In parallel with the Roman law-based developments described above, the Scottish 
Law Commission commenced the work leading ultimately to the AWI. In September 
1991 the Commission produced Discussion Paper No 94 Mentally Disabled Adults: 
Legal Arrangements for Managing their Welfare and Finances (‘the SLC Discussion 
Paper’). Following wide-ranging consultation and discussion, in September 1995 the 
Commission published its Report on Incapable Adults (Report No 151 – ‘the SLC 
Report’). Government published its own Consultation Paper Managing the Finances 
and Welfare of Incapable Adults in February 1997. There was however increasing 
anxiety that the pace of deliberation did not match the urgency of the need for law 
reform. Following sustained campaigning, and steps towards devolution, the Scottish 
Executive published its proposals in Making the Right Moves: Rights and Protection 
for Adults with Incapacity (August 1999). The AWI followed as ‘the first large Bill on a 
major policy area to be passed by the Scottish Parliament’.48 
 
B. The SLC Discussion Paper (1991) 
 
From the outset of the reform process, the purposes of any intervention were made 
clear. As paragraph 1.7 of the Discussion Paper made clear:  
 
There is also a greater awareness of the rights of the mentally disabled. The philosophy that 
lies behind the new approach is one of minimum intervention in the lives of the mentally 
disabled consistent with providing proper care and protection and maximum help to enable 
individuals to realise their full potential and make the best use of the abilities they have. 
 
The inherent tensions between autonomy and protection, again, were clearly 
understood from the outset and described in paragraph 1.8. 
46 Ward, The Power to Act (SSMH, 1990) 
47 1992 SCLR 947 
48 Mr Iain Gray, Deputy Minister for Community Care, speaking in the Scottish Parliament on 29th 
March 2000 
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There is an inherent conflict or tension between the principles of maximum freedom for 
mentally disabled people and their protection. Giving mentally disabled people exactly the 
same rights as mentally normal people would often result in the disabled harming themselves 
and others and becoming victims of exploitation and abuse. Protection from these 
consequences necessarily involves some curtailment of the rights that normal people enjoy. 
Indeed a certain level of protection may enhance the ability of the mentally disabled to enjoy 
their other rights to a greater extent. 
 
By contrast, as to the core question addressed in this paper, the process of 
consultation and consideration produced a significant shift. Paragraphs 2.86 and 
4.75 of the Discussion Paper, dealing respectively with personal welfare and 
financial matters, both included the following (close in its intention to the MCA 
position described in paragraph above): 
 
We tend to favour continuation of the ‘best interests’ rule coupled with requiring the guardian to 
consult with and have regard to the wishes of the mentally disabled person, family and carers. 
The previously expressed views of the disabled person could and should be taken into account 
but should not override the judgment of the guardian as to the current best interests of the 
incapacitated person. 
 
C. Evolution of Principles and Terminology, Rejection of ‘Best Interests’ 
 
Prior to instructing the first draft Bill, the SLC team had however already decided to 
recommend rejection of the ‘best interests’ test. That rejection was subsequently 
expressed in the SLC Report as follows: 
 
Our general principles do not rely on the concept of best interests of the incapable adult. … We 
consider that ‘best interests’ by itself is too vague and would require to be supplemented by 
further factors which have to be taken into account. We also consider that ‘best interests’ does 
not give due weight to the views of the adult, particularly to wishes and feelings which he or she 
had expressed while capable of doing so. The concept of best interests was developed in the 
context of child law where a child’s level of understanding may not be high and will usually have 
been lower in the past. Incapable adults such as those who are mentally ill, head injured or 
suffering from dementia at the time when a decision has to be made in connection with them, 
will have possessed full mental powers before their present incapacity. We think it is wrong to 
equate such adults with children and for that reason would avoid extending child law concepts 
to them. Accordingly, the general principles we set out below are framed without express 
reference to best interests.49 
 
In the passage from the SLC Discussion Paper quoted above, the reference to ‘best 
interests’ was coupled with references to the wishes of the adult and others, 
including previously expressed views of the adult. It is accordingly relevant to 
balance the ensuing rejection of a ‘best interests’ criterion with the development of 
the status accorded to the views and wishes of the adult. In the first draft Bill 
instructed by SLC, reference to the wishes and feelings of the adult was subsidiary 
to the principles of minimum necessary intervention and the least restrictive option in 
relation to the freedom of the adult, consistent with the purpose of the intervention, 
which was set out in s 1(3). Section 1(4) required that in determining what 
intervention satisfied the requirements of s 1(3), account should be taken, so far as 
was reasonably practicable, of ‘the wishes and feelings of the mentally disordered 
adult, in particular any written directions given by him while he was mentally 
49 Scottish Law Commission, Report  on Incapable Adults, (Scot Law Com No 151, 1995)  para 2.50 
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capable’. In the draft Bill annexed to the SLC Report, the principles were stated as in 
the AWI, as quoted in paragraph 24 above. Section 1(4)(a) is not subsidiary to any 
other principle. It directs that account shall be taken of the present and past wishes 
and feelings of the adult, if ascertainable by any means.  
 
The term ‘paradigm shift’ was not used in relation to either the eventual proposals in 
the SLC Report or the AWI itself. The concept of a shift from ‘old law’ to ‘new law’50 
was however well understood. Further, following passage of the AWI Ward 
suggested the term ‘constructing decisions’ for the processes of decision-making 
required by the AWI. This is a process requiring respect for the competent decisions 
of every adult, regardless of disability, and a process of what the General Comment 
terms ‘best interpretation’ to the extent that the adult is unable to make, or to 
communicate with any amount of assistance, competent decisions. Ward described 
the resulting processes fully in Chapter 15.51  
 
While that could be claimed to be a description of a ‘supported decision-making 
regime’, incorporating – in relation to factual incapacity – a ‘best interpretation’ 
approach rather than a ‘best interests’ approach, questions remain as to whether the 
AWI is sufficiently robust in requiring such an approach and in excluding what may 
amount in fact (and regardless of terminology) to a paternalistic ‘best interests’ 
approach; and whether that outcome is consistently achieved in practice. Those 
questions lead us to the next section of this Part 4. 
 
D. The AWI: Case Law Evolution  
 
Perhaps due to the lack of a specialised judiciary, coupled with the smaller volume of 
cases generated by a smaller population, it is not possible to identify from a review of 
Scottish case law such differing lines of thought as were identified in Part 3. There 
have been significant lines of development, through several individual cases, in 
matters such as use of the AWI to authorise Will-making and similar (in the absence 
of any ‘statutory Will’ provisions in Scots law), but there have been no equivalent 
progressive and differing lines of development in relation to whether (for example) 
the benefit principle equates to a best interests test, or the relative weight to be given 
to the benefit principle when balanced against the others, particularly the past and 
present wishes and feelings of the adult. That is not to say, however, that there have 
not been significant decisions in these matters. However, it is surprisingly rare for 
decisions under the AWI to refer to many (or indeed any) precedents under the AWI 
regime. Where short lines of authority have been developed, contradictory views 
tend to be formed extraneously – in one case, in the pronouncements of Scottish 
Government, and in relation to another, a clear but uncited decision of the Supreme 
Court in an English case. 
 
For the above reasons, the structure of this Scottish section differs from the 
equivalent section for England & Wales above. All relevant available decisions under 
AWI are listed in the Appendix to this paper, and are referred to – where not more 
50 Described by Ward in Adults with Incapacity Legislation (W Green 2008)  3 
51 ‘Constructing Decisions’ in Adult Incapacity (W Green 2003) 
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fully – simply by the numbering in the Appendix.52 A further feature has shaped this 
section. Because Scottish guardianship law evolved from the re-introduction and 
development of tutory described above, some of the experience under that regime 
remains relevant.  
 
One startling result of analysis of the cases in the Appendix is that, despite the 
explicit rejection of a best interests test for the purposes of the AWI as narrated 
above, the frequency with which sheriffs have at least in part chosen to base their 
decisions on what they considered to be in the relevant adult’s best interests. This 
occurred in cases 10, 13, 21, 22 and 25, that is to say 5 or 18.5% of the cases in the 
Appendix. It is necessary, however, to look more closely at this finding. 
 
Until his retirement in early 2015, Sheriff John Baird was for all practical purposes a 
specialist sheriff, being lead sheriff for AWI cases in Glasgow Sheriff Court. In the 
course of his career he dealt with well over 3,000 AWI cases. Twelve (44%) of the 
decisions in the Appendix are his, being cases 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 17, 19, 20, 23 and 
24. In all of these he referred to the benefit principle. None of his decisions is based 
on any ‘best interests’ concept. Indeed, in case 2453 he considered a Minute lodged 
by a consultant geriatrician in charge of a long stay patient in an acute NHS hospital, 
seeking directions to be given to the appointed guardian. The adult’s daughter was 
her guardian and had for some time refused to exercise her powers enabling her to 
make arrangements for the adult’s long term care, despite being advised that the 
adult could not return home. The applicant considered that the adult required 
continuing medical care which could be provided most suitably in a facility such as a 
care home and asked the court whether in order to secure the adult’s welfare and 
best interests it was necessary for her to reside in a facility providing NHS continuing 
care, and if so, that the court make an order directing the guardian to consent to the 
adult residing at the care home and to direct her to convey or make arrangements for 
the adult’s conveyance thereto. The specific question before the court was: ‘In order 
to secure the Adult’s welfare and best interests is it necessary for her to reside in a 
facility which provides NHS continuing care?’ Sheriff Baird pointed out that ‘benefit’, 
not ‘best interests’, was the relevant test, but use of the latter term points to a 
disappointing level of knowledge of the AWI principles even among professionals 
likely to be much engaged with aspects of the AWI regime. Sheriff Baird in fact 
referred to ‘benefit’ rather than ‘best interests’ in all of the decisions listed. 
 
If Sheriff Baird’s decisions are set aside, and also setting aside case 1 in view of the 
careful and limited use of ‘best interests’ by Sheriff Ireland in that case (see below), 
the remaining decisions are those of a total of ten different sheriffs (or sheriffs 
principal), of whom five – or one half – have founded upon ‘best interests’ in at least 
one of their decisions. 
 
We are left with the difficulty of what the sheriffs who have used the term ‘best 
52 Ward thanks his colleague on the core research group of the Three Jurisdictions Project, Rebecca 
McGregor, for compiling this list and highlighting relevant key features in each case. Rebecca is a 
research assistant in the Centre for Mental Health and Incapacity Law, Rights and Policy at Edinburgh 
Napier University. 
53 B, Minuter 2014 SLT (Sh Ct) 5 
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interests’ in their decisions actually meant by it. Case 3 54  and case 10 55  both 
address the question of whether a guardianship order was appropriate in relation to 
decisions to change the place of residence of an adult who (in each case) was 
compliant but had been assessed as not capable of making a valid decision in the 
matter. Sheriff McDonald at Kilmarnock in case 10 stated that she was following the 
views of Sheriff Baird at Glasgow in case 3. Both referred to the full range of relevant 
principles, Sheriff Baird without mention of ‘best interests’, but Sheriff McDonald’s 
judgment included:  
 
This relates to the question as to whether or not intervention is in the best interests of the adult. 
 
It is my view that the best interests of the adult would be served by allowing her sons to take 
decisions for her. Section 1(4)(a) of the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 indicates 
that the present and past wishes and feelings of the adult, so far as they can be ascertained, 
must be taken into account. I heard evidence from the adult's two sons that it was their 
mother's wishes that they should deal with all of her affairs. This was not disputed by the 
respondent. Further, in terms of s 1(4)(b), the views of the nearest relative must also be taken 
account of and, again, the adult's two sons indicated that they wished to be appointed welfare 
guardians. These sections are not mutually exclusive, but should be read in conjunction with 
each other. 
 
The decisions in cases 3 and 10 produced disagreement not by other judges, but 
Scottish Government in Guidance for Local Authorities (March 2007) Provision of 
Community Care Services to Adults with Incapacity, referring to Muldoon, stated 
that: ‘The Scottish Executive does not agree with this interpretation of the ECtHR 
cases’. This however was not a matter of the relative weight to be attributed to 
different principles. In general terms, the frequent use of the words ‘best interests’ 
above appears to point to the thinking of a generalist judiciary, well-schooled in child 
law, where the best interests of the child are a paramount consideration, and still 
guided by that thinking – as well as that language – in the very different situation of 
adults for whom the best interests text was rejected for purposes of the AWI 
jurisdiction. 
 
In the context of any attempt to ensure compliance with CRPD, case 3 (Muldoon) 
bears further consideration. Sheriff Baird held that in every case where a court is 
dealing with the question of determining the residence of an adult who is incapable 
but compliant, ‘the least restrictive option will be the granting of a guardianship order 
under the Act (assuming of course that all the other statutory requirements are 
satisfied), for that way only will the necessary safeguards and statutory and 
regulatory framework to protect the adult (and the guardian), come into play.’ Sheriff 
Baird’s conclusion that imposing a decision as to place of residence upon a 
compliant but incapable adult was a breach of Article 5 of ECHR resonates to an 
extent with the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in P v Cheshire West.56 
But if a ‘constructing decisions’ (or best interpretation) approach had been applied to 
the facts, that might perhaps have warranted the very different conclusion that the 
adult’s contentment with her placement was sufficient to authorise it, and that her 
desire not to have a guardian should be respected, as there was no contravention of 
her rights sufficient to overrule in that regard her identified will and preferences. 
54 Muldoon, Applicant 2005 SLT (Sh Ct) 52 
55 M, Applicant 2009 SLT (Sh Ct) 185 
56 [2014] UKSC 19 
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As to the contrast between a supported decision-making approach based on best 
interpretation, or a substitute decision-making approach based on best interests, 
among the cases listed in the Appendix, this is most clearly found upon 
consideration of the first and last, being case 157 and case 27.58 While the decision 
of Sheriff Seith Ireland in case 1 (JM) uses the term ‘best interests’, he does so only 
to the extent of equating ‘benefit’ with ‘best interests’, then in effect (in that case) 
giving priority to ‘the views of the adult’. Sheriff Principal Stephen in case 27 (G) 
does not use the words ‘best interests’, but more significantly she appears to equate 
the benefit test with a best interests approach and – significantly – to treat it as 
overriding other considerations. Both cases were contests between a relative of the 
adult and the local authority chief social work officer for appointment as guardian. 
 
In case 1 (JM) the ‘constructing decisions’ methodology proposed in Chapter 15 of 
Adult Incapacity was adopted in the successful arguments for the respondent, Mrs 
M. Her husband Mr M had been seriously injured in an accident in 1987. After 15 
years in hospital, authorities decided that it was appropriate to discharge him on the 
basis that he no longer needed full-time medical or nursing care. He and Mrs M were 
happily married. They shared the same outlook and values. Mrs M was initially 
resistant to discharge because she feared that Mr M would not receive the care 
which his difficult needs required. However, a placement which appeared to be 
suitable had been identified, the drawback being that it offered short-term rather than 
long-term care, so that further decisions about suitable placement were likely to be 
required within two years. The central question was whether the court should simply 
make its own objective decision as to what seemed to be in Mr M’s best interests, or 
whether – having found that either contender would be suitable for appointment – the 
sheriff should arrive at a decision taking into account Mr M’s known views which he 
had been able to express before his accident, the marriage which he and his wife 
had entered and sustained, and the values which they shared. Sheriff Ireland’s 
judgment included the following passage: 
 
However, coming to a concluding answer to that question has been neither straightforward nor 
easy for the court. This has required anxious consideration of the general principles set out in 
section 1 of the Act and the duties placed on the court in appointing a guardian in terms of 
section 59 of the Act. 
 
…the legislative purpose of the Adults with Incapacity Act goes beyond, in my view, the test of 
what is in the best interest of the adult. That may be a necessary starting-point - and the test 
the court has to make of welfare guardian in terms of section 59 has, by implication, the 
requirements of a 'best interests' approach. However, most importantly, section 59 has to be 
read against section 1(2) of the Act. In summary, this provides that there should be no 
intervention in the affairs of an adult unless the person responsible for authorising the 
intervention (in this case the court), is satisfied that the intervention will benefit the adult. This, 
in my view, means the court which authorises the intervention, in this case the appointment of a 
welfare guardian, has to have the best interests of the adult in mind, equiperating 'benefits' with 
'best interests' which I hold as a reasonable construction. 
 
Yet the legislative intention of the Scottish Parliament can be found to have gone beyond 'best 
interests' by an examination of section 1(4), especially paragraphs (a), (b) and (d) which I have 
quoted above. 
57 North Ayrshire Council v JM 2004 SCLR 956 
58 G v West Lothian Council 2014 WL 6862565 
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I construe these provisions as requiring the court to have regard to the views of the adult (JM) 
as expressed prior to his incapacity, and as far as is ascertainable, at present, as may be 
evidenced by the views of the nearest relative (PM) and his daughter (FM). 
 
This can clearly be categorised as a decision based upon a supported decision-
making approach, applying a best interpretation of Mr M’s will and preferences. 
 
By contrast, in deciding case 27 (G), which was an appeal from the decision of 
Sheriff Susan A Craig in case 25, Sheriff Principal Mhairi Stephen said: 
 
This is indeed the core principle namely that it is the welfare of the adult and the benefit to the 
adult which is the overarching principle. The court then has to consider the least restrictive 
option and take into account the present and past wishes and feelings of the adult and the 
views of the nearest relative and the primary carer of the adult in so far as it is reasonable and 
practicable to do so. The sheriff also requires to take into account the views of any other person 
who appears to the sheriff to have an interest in the welfare of the adult. 
 
It must be a cause for concern that the journey in time from the first case considered 
(case 1, reported in 2004) to the last (case 27, decided a decade later) has been a 
journey away from a ‘constructing decisions’ approach, giving primacy to the ‘will and 
preferences’ of the adult or their best interpretation, towards a ‘best interests’ 
approach in the sense used, and criticised, by the UN Committee. 
 
VI. OBSERVATIONS 
 
If the MCA and the AWI as enacted are considered and compared in the 
retrospective light of CRPD and the views of the UN Committee, they might be seen 
simplistically as representing the two contrasting models of substitute decision-
making based on best interests (the MCA) and supported decision-making based on 
best interpretation (the AWI). In the case of the AWI, the contrast might seem to be 
emphasised by consideration of the development of re-introduced tutors to adults in 
the period 1986 – 1992, and how that experience was carried forward into the AWI, 
and into early anticipations as to how the AWI should be operated.  
 
Looked at more carefully, however, both Acts ultimately require a structured 
consideration of a series of questions and analysis of a set of factors relating to the 
individual in question, against an overarching set of principles. Further, and by 
reference to the requirement in Article 12(4) CRPD for ‘measures relating to the 
exercise of legal capacity [to] respect the rights, will and preferences of the person,’ 
we would suggest that neither can – at present – properly be said to do so, because 
on their face neither Act:  
 
1. Expressly places an obligation upon anyone to take steps to identify the wishes and 
feelings (to the extent that this can be said to be synonymous with the will and preferences) 
of the individual;  
 
2. Expressly provides that (or how) the wishes and feelings have priority. The ‘constructed 
decision-making’ hierarchy identified above in relation to Scotland is not expressly provided 
for in s.1(4) AWI: for instance by the use of ‘particular regard’ or some equivalent term in 
relation to s.1(4)(a)). The MCA provides that consideration must be given to the person’s 
past and present wishes and feelings ‘and in particular’ any relevant written statement 
made by him when he had capacity but that could narrowly be read solely as requiring 
particular regard in the context of consideration of wishes and feelings, as opposed to 
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requiring particular regard to be given to such written statements in the overall 
consideration of best interests;  
 
3. Expressly provides how ‘respect’ for ascertainable wishes and feelings is to be secured, for 
instance by requiring reasons to be given for departure from them.  
 
It is further important to understand how both Acts have been applied in practice. We 
have sought to identify above how (on the one hand) the evolution of the case-law in 
England & Wales could be seen as exemplifying a trend towards paying greater 
heed to the individual’s wishes and feelings (and, perhaps, suggesting what ‘respect’ 
might look like in practice), while (on the other) judicial decisions in Scotland have 
disappointingly trended, particularly in the last decade, towards what seems in 
practice to bring a more paternalistic ‘best interests’ approach – even using that 
rejected terminology – and away from greater respect for the individual’s will and 
preferences, and past and present wishes and feelings.  
 
For these reasons, both stemming from the language of the Acts and from the way 
that language has been interpreted in practice, we conclude that compliance with 
CRPD would undoubtedly require amendment of both Acts. In particular, and as a 
minimum, s 4 of MCA and s 1 of AWI would require to be re-cast. 
 
VII. APPENDIX 
 
Scottish Cases 
 
In the foregoing paper, these cases are in places referred to only by the numbers 
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